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940 P.2d 539 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997); State v. Robinson. 860 
P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). "However, this 
court may find an abuse of discretion only if we conclude that 'no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649,651 
(Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted). 
2. Did the fact that defense counsel did not request a separate restitution 
hearing violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel? 
"When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on 
appeal, the claim will be reviewed only "if the . . . record is adequate to permit decision 
of the issue." State v. Penman. 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Humphries. 818P.2d 1027,1029 (Utah 1991)). "Where the claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel 'is raised for the first time on direct appeal, we must decide whether defendant 
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.'" State v. Cosev, 
873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461, 466 
(Utah App. 1993)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998), set forth in Addendum A. 
2 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KENT WILLIAM BLANCHARD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 980044-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a restitution order requiring defendant to pay $882.00 as part 
of his sentence for theft, a third-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1995), 
in the Second Judicial Court of Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jon M. 
Memmott, Judge, presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial judge err where, at the request of defendant's counsel and 
with the input and apparent acquiescence of defendant, the court 
imposed an order of restitution as part of defendant's sentence without 
conducting a separate hearing on the restitution issue? 
A trial court's order of restitution will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial 
court exceeded the authority prescribed by law or abused its discretion. State v. McBride, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on October 20,1997 with one count of third-degree felony 
theft under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R.l). A bench trial was held December 
26, 1997 (R. 52). After both parties rested, the court convicted defendant and sentenced 
him to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years (R. 18). The 
court ordered defendant to pay restitution of $882.00. 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 21, 1998 (R. 19). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant pocketed $1,831.00 in payments from his employer's client while 
inducing his employer to pay $1,369.00 for goods and services received by that client. 
Brad Howard owned Landscape Express, Inc., a landscaping business (R. 52 at 8). 
Howard met defendant in March 1997 (id. ai 9). When Howard learned that defendant 
had some background and experience in landscaping work, he suggested that defendant 
come to work for him (id. at 10). 
As the relationship progressed, Howard's trust in defendant grew, and he gave 
defendant more authority (id. at 11). Defendant acted as job-site foreman on several 
landscaping projects (id. at 10). He proved to be shrewd at dealing with customers, and 
brought in, in Howard's words, "some pretty good income'1 for the business (id. at 11). 
Howard and defendant discussed becoming business partners. Howard had his attorney 
draw up papers to formalize the relationship, but defendant declined to become a partner 
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when he became concerned that he would have to take on some of the company's accrued 
debt (id.). 
In late July or early August, Howard and defendant met with the Crimin family to 
discuss landscaping the Crimins' residential property (id. at 14-5). Defendant negotiated 
an $ 185000.00 contract with the Crimins for excavating, building a retaining wall, putting 
in plants, laying sod and installing drains (id. at 16). Over the course of the project, 
defendant acted as the job-site foreman. Checks from the Crimins pursuant to the contract 
were made payable to Landscape Express, and were deposited into the company account. 
While the landscaping job was underway, the Crimins decided they wanted a 
sunken trampoline, a rose garden, and a sandbox in addition to the work included in the 
$18,000 contract. Unknown to Howard, defendant told Mrs. Crimin that if she made 
checks for the additional work payable to him rather than to Landscape Express, it would 
save her money (id. at 72). She wrote three checks payable to defendant totaling 
$1,831.00 (id. at 73). 
All the vendors and laborers who took part in the additional work were paid in full 
out of Landscape Express's bank account (id- at 25). Howard calculated that the 
company's expenditures for the additional work totaled $1,369.45 (id. at 44; State's 
Exhibit nos. 1, 3, 4, 6, and 12; R.52 at 21-23, 42-44). 
Defendant admitted at trial that none of the $1,831.00 he received from Mrs. 
Crimin was paid to Landscape Express (id. at 131). He also testified that Howard had not 
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paid him the $517.00 he was owed for his last week of work on the Crimin project (id. at 
114). Howard acknowledged that he withheld defendant's last paycheck (id. at 47, 58). 
Defendant claimed that Howard owed him $2,370.00 in overtime pay (id. at 114). 
He said, "[Howard] held my overtime out till he was better financially stable . . . . [W]e 
discussed I wouldn't be paid overtime at the time because they couldn't afford it" (id. at 
153-4). Howard testified, "I did receive something from the workers, you know, 
Workforce, Utah Job Corps," but stated that he had not been aware of defendant's claim 
for overtime until after defendant left Landscape Express (id. at 175-76). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court found defendant guilty of theft for depriving 
Landscape Express of the three checks totaling $1,831.00, and using services of 
Landscape Express amounting to $1,369.00 (id. at 187-88). The court asked defendant 
if he wanted a presentence report prepared before his sentence was imposed. The 
following discussion took place: 
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I have advised Mr. Blanchard 
of his right to have the presentence report 
done. He informs me he': 2t the prison, he 
doesn't feel that it would do any good, that 
they would recommend a prison 
commitment. That's my understanding 
based on his history. . . . Mr. Harward 
[prosecuting attorney] has talked to us 
previously about sentencing today, and it's 
my understanding the State will not object 
to concurrent time. The main issue here 
would be restitution, and we'd ask you to 
order that as you felt was appropriate. 
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Defendant: 
[Prosecutor]: 
Defendant: 
[Prosecutor]: 
The court: 
Defendant: 
The court: 
[Prosecutor]: 
[Defense counsel]: 
The court: 
Have I stated everything correctly, Mr. 
Blanchard? 
[Inaudible] restitution. 
That's correct. I do have comments and 
judgments [inaudible]. 
[Inaudible] my payroll commences. 
And I'm willing to recommend that the 
sentence commitment be concurrent with 
the term he's now serving. We do want an 
order of restitution. I guess there are 
different ways you can approach this, 
because we're claiming— 
Well, let me tell you that I would probably 
order a restitution in this case, in that if it 
wants to be different from that or argued, 
I would argue that restitution of the 
$ 1,821l for the three checks. Less an offset 
for the last payroll check that he's due.. . 
. So it would the 500 - what is it, 31? 
17. 
So it would $1,821 minus $517. So it 
would be $1304. 
Yes. 
Your Honor, the victim here, Paul 
Howard, gave an itemized statement to the 
Court, and it totaled $1,300. The $600 out 
of the $1,821 that you've mentioned was 
actually given for topsoil or it went toward 
topsoil, was paid off, as I understood. 
Well, my understanding is that he got a 
check for that topsoil already.2 This is 
*The three checks actually totaled $1,831.00. 
2Howard testified that he paid defendant $600 to reimburse him for topsoil that 
defendant purchased for the Crimin job with defendant's personal check (id. at 58-9). 
Defendant claimed that "[t]o my knowledge, I don't think I ever have been [reimbursed 
for the topsoil]" (id. at 114). However, he stated on cross-examination that "I don't know 
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[Defense counsel]: 
[Prosecutor]: 
[Defense counsel]: 
[Prosecutor]: 
The court: 
[Prosecutor]: 
The court: 
[Defense counsel]: 
Defendant: 
[Defense counsel]: 
Defendant: 
[Defense counsel]: 
money that he received from Mrs. Crimin 
for this job, went in, and should have been 
paid to Landscape Express. I mean, I 
believe that the Court-
Do you want to have a hearing, or do we 
want to it-I mean. 
I think it's better the way the court did it. 
the $1,821 minus-
With an offset for the-
Last week's wages. 
And then both parties need to be advised, 
this doesn't affect any civil claim one 
way-
Anything for overtime or any of that stuff 
will have to be dealt with separately. 
You can still sue. 
Not from incarceration you can't. 
You need to let the court know if you feel 
comfortable- Your order, then, would 
actually be for-
'Cause I think it should be-he should 
not be entitled to earn a profit on the 
side jobs where I did all the labor 
myself. If he's only out thirteen 
hundred and something dollars in 
materials and labor, as you're claiming, 
then my $500[3] should be subtracted 
from that and difference should be paid 
to him. 
I wonder if we could ask him-
if I've have [sic] been or have not been . . . I don't have any knowledge of being 
reimbursed 'cause the job has not been reconciled yet" (id. at 136). On rebuttal, the 
prosecution introduced a $600 Landscape Express check signed by defendant, payable to 
defendant, and marked "topsoil Crimiii" (id. at 173-5). The court expressly resolved the 
issue against defendant (id. at 187). 
3Defendant was apparently referring to his withheld final paycheck. 
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[Defendant]: 
The court: 
[Defense counsel]: 
The court: 
[Defense counsel]: 
[Prosecutor]: 
The court: 
[Prosecutor]: 
The court: 
[Prosecutor]: 
Defendant: 
[Prosecutor]: 
Defendant: 
[Defense counsel]: 
[Prosecutor]: 
[Defense counsel]: 
[Prosecutor]: 
Defendant: 
[Prosecutor]: 
'Cause I figure I owe him about $500. 
That was stated in the original phone 
conversation. 
Well, if he's willing to accept that, I 
mean-
Why don't we find out from Mr. Howard 
if he's willing to accept the-it would 
actually take it down to about $800 and 
something, the thirteen that he asked for 
minus-
It would be, what, $1,369? 
$1,369. 
In the context of restitution, in a criminal 
case, he would accept a restitution order 
for the amount, the $1,300 that he-
$1,369. 
-less the-
$517. 
Yes. However, here's something he's 
going-the tools and things that you're 
holding for collateral,^ he wants to know 
if he can get permission, some way of 
getting recovery the-
I have a $30 trailer hitch, but it's locked in 
the back of a storage unit, so . . . 
Okay. If I could-
I could send him a check for 30 bucks 
sometime. 
Do you want to add 30 onto-
Can we add that on? 
You keep the hitch. 
Okay. 
I don't have any other tools. 
All right. 
4Howard testified that defendant had kept a trailer hitch, a tape measure, and other 
tools that belonged to Howard. He said defendant told him that he was keeping the tools 
as "collateral" (id. at 53). 
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The court: Then the Court will enter the following 
sentence to the charge of theft, a felony of 
the third degree. The defendant is 
sentenced to Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate teAm of zero to five years. 
Restitution is set in the amount $882, that 
was the $1369 paid by Landscape Express 
less the $517 wages withheld, so it would 
be an offset for the wage claim, and then 
there would be $30 for the trailer hitch. 
The Court would order an additional $250 
for public defender fees. The Court will 
order that sentence to run concurrent with 
any present sentence in the Utah State 
Prison. 
R. 52. at 188-92, Addendum B (emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that, in light of his" clear objection to the imposition, amount and 
distribution of restitution," the trial court err:d in failing to allow him a full restitution 
hearing. Appellant's Brief at 12. Defendant's claims are not supported by the record, 
which shows that defendant himself negotiated the restitution amount in open court. 
Defendant requested that the court subtract "my $50u" from the "thirteen hundred and 
something" paid out by the victim, and "the difference should be paid to him" (id. at 190-
91). There was no error in the trial court's failure to conduct a separate restitution hearing 
where defendant requested that restitution be determined and then assisted in the court's 
calculation of the amount. Even if the court had erred, defendant invited the error by 
suggesting to the court the formula ultimately used in determining restitution. 
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Defendant further maintains that, in determining restitution, the court erred in 
failing to consider the factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c) (Supp 1998). 
This issue is not adequately briefed, and this Court should accordingly decline to address 
it. If the Court does decide to address the merits, it should affirm the restitution order 
because defendant, in asking the court to determine restitution, effectively acknowledged 
that no factors making restitution inappropriate were present, and actively waived the 
entry of formal findings. Additionally, even if the Court finds that the trial court erred in 
failing to consider the subsection 8(c) factors on the record, any error was harmless. The 
restitution ordered was a trivial amount ($882) and, inasmuch as the theft occurred in the 
context of the defendant's employment, there was ample evidence in the record that 
defendant had job skills enabling him to earn money to reimburse his victim. Defendant 
has not shown a reasonable probability that, absent the alleged error, a different outcome 
would have occurred. 
Finally, defendant urges this Court to find that he received ineffective assistance 
of counsel because his attorney below failed to object to Uic court* s restitution order and 
to request a separate restitution hearing. Under the two-part test for ineffective assistance 
claims set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, defendant's claim 
fails because he has failed to show either (1) that his attorney's conduct in failing to object 
and request a hearing on restitution fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
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professional judgment, or (2) that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
different if a separate restitution hearing had been held. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DETERMINING RESTITUTION WITHOUT 
HOLDING A SEPARATE HEARING ON THE ISSUE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998) requires that "[i]f the defendant 
objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the 
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." However, in order to 
receive a separate hearing, defendant must first object to the imposition amount, or 
distribution of restitution. Absent such an objection, the statute does not require a hearing. 
Here, the record does not reflect that any cbjection was made. Thus, no restitution 
hearing was required. 
A. The Record Does Not Support Defendant's Claim that He Objected to the 
Imposition, Amount or Distribution of Restitution. 
Defendant maintains that he "clearly expressed his objection to the imposition, 
amount, and distribution of the contemplated restitution." Appellant's Brief at 15. 
However, the record in this case proves that the court did not determine the restitution 
issue sua sponte, but was invited by defense counsel to resolve the matter. After the court 
rendered its finding of guilt, defendant's counsel stated that M[t]he main issue here would 
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be restitution, and we'd ask you to order that as you felt was appropriate. Have I stated 
that correctly, Mr. Blanchard?" (R. 52 at 188-89). Defendant's response was "[Inaudible] 
restitution [Inaudible] my payroll commences" (|d- at 189). Then, as noted above, 
defendant supplied the court with the formula it ultimately used in determining the award 
of restitution. Finally, defendant further participated in the restitution colloquy by 
volunteering, on the subject of his retention of the victim's tools, that "I have a $30 trailer 
hitch, but it's locked in the back of a storage unit, so . . . I could send him a check for 30 
bucks sometime" (id. at 191-2). Defendant's comments were not those of an individual 
objecting to the "imposition, amount or distribution" of restitution, but one actively 
participating in determining the appropriate amount. 
The statements in the record to which defendant refers in support of his claim that 
he objected to restitution fail to support his contentions. See Appellant's Brief at 14. 
When the court proposed determining restitution by totaling the three checks written by 
Mrs. Crimin and subtracting the amount of defendant's withheld final paycheck, defendant 
did, as he argues on appeal, express his dissatisfaction * vith the court's proposed restitution 
formula by stating that "he [the victim] should not be entitled to earn a profit on the side 
jobs where I did all the labor myself (R. 52 at 190). However, defendant followed that 
sentence by arguing that "If he's only out thirteen hundred and something dollars in 
materials and labor, as you're claiming, then my $500 should be subtracted from that and 
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difference paid to him" (id. at 190-91). The court obligingly adopted defendant's formula 
for determining restitution, resolving the issue exactly as he requested. 
Defendant also points to his statement that "I figure I owe him about $500. That 
was stated in the original phone conversation" as an expression of his objection to the 
restitution award (id.). On appeal, defendant interprets that remark as an assertion that "he 
only owed Mr. Howard 'about $500.'" Appellant's Brief at 14 (emphasis added). That 
construction is not consistent with the rest of the record. At trial, Howard testified that he 
and defendant had a telephone conversation in which defendant offered to pay Howard 
$500 up front and then pay back the rest of the money later (id. at 50-1). Defendant 
admitted in testimony that during the phone conversation he told Howard that "[i]f there 
was any money owing to him, yeah, I would give him the $500 and make payments" (id. 
at 149) (emphasis added). Defendant's testimony regarding the telephone conversation 
constituted an acknowledgment that an amount greater than $500 might be owed. His 
other testimony was vague as to how much was owed.5 In light of his previous 
contradictory or ambiguous statements, the judge would not have interpreted his statement 
that "I figure I owe him about $500" as an assertion that he only owed Howard $500. The 
statement, taken in combination with (1) his urging seconds earlier that the court 
determine restitution by subtracting "my $500" (defendant's final paycheck) from the 
5Defendant asserted that "[t]he financial thing was never settled up on this job" (R. 
52 at 40). 
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"thirteen hundred and something" and (2) his testimony that he agreed to "give [Howard] 
the $500 and make payments," is ambiguous at best. It cannot be regarded as a clear 
expression of objection. 
The record simply does not support defendant's claim that he objected to the 
imposition, amount or distribution of restitution. Therefore, under the clear language of 
the statute, the court was not required to hold a restitution hearing. 
B. Defendant Assisted the Trial Court in Determining the Amount of Restitution 
and Invited the Result of Which He Now Complains. 
As argued supra, the record does not support defendant's claim that the court erred 
in failing to grant him a separate restitution hearing. However, even if error Had occurred, 
it was error invited by defendant. In State v. Dunn, the Utah Supreme Court wrote that 
"[w]e have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing error." 850 P.2d 
1201,1220 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah App. 1991). 
Here, defendant supplied the court with the formula it used in determining his restitution 
obligation, and gave every indication that he acquiesced in the court's order. He now 
complains on appeal about an alleged error he led the trial court into committing. In 
accordance with the doctrine of invited error, this Court should refuse to consider his 
claim, and should affirm the restitution order. 
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C. Even Assuming Arguendo that the Trial Court Erred, Defendant Was Not 
Prejudiced by the Court's Failure to Conduct a Separate Restitution Hearing. 
Defendant asserts that the failure to conduct a separate hearing on restitution was 
harmful because evidence was presented at trial that Howard owed defendant $2,370.00 
in overtime pay.6 Defendant appears to contend that the amount of overtime pay owed 
him would have been taken into account at a restitution hearing, and that a different result 
would have been occurred. Defendant's argument lacks merit because defendant's 
unrelated civil wage claim would not have been an appropriate subject of inquiry in the 
context of a criminal restitution hearing. 
Restitution is an aspect of criminal sentencing. Under the terms of the sentencing 
statute, restitution is available for a victim's pecuniary damages. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(l)(d)(Supp. 1997). "Pecuniary damages" are defined as "all special damages, but not 
general damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(c)(Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). The plain words of the 
statute restrict the inquiry to a determination of what damages resulted from the 
defendant's criminal activities. 
6Defendant asserts that he "submitted copies of payroll checks as evidence" of his 
entitlement to overtime pay. Appellant's Brief at 17. In fact, no checks were offered or 
admitted at trial, and the only evidence of the existence of an overtime issue was 
defendant's testimony (R. 52 at 114). 
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Neither the restitution statute nor the case law make any provision for a defendant 
to inject an unrelated counterclaim into a criminal restitution determination. Defendant 
has failed to raise or brief any basis for concluding that in a restitution hearing, the trial 
court would have been required to consider the alleged overtime owed defendant and to 
offset the amount of restitution ordered accordingly. Defendant has therefore failed to 
show that the alleged error was harmful. Consequently, the restitution order should be 
affirmed. 
D. Defendant Received Notice of the Charge Against Him and an Opportunity 
to Be Heard. Therefore, He Was Not Denied Due Process. 
Defendant claims that the court's failure to conduct a full hearing on restitution 
deprived him of due process, in that he did not receive timely and adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. Appellant's Brief at 16. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A defendant has no automatic right to a separate restitution hearing. The 
restitution statute provides that a full hearing is required if the defendant objects to the 
imposition, amount, or distribution of restitution. Conversely, if a defendant does not 
object, the court may impose restitution without a hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201 (4)(e) (Supp. 1997). Here, defendant affirmatively requested imposition of restitution 
(R. 52 at 188-89). 
The restitution statute also states that "[w]hen a person is convicted of a criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
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impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime " 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). Defendant's crime 
clearly resulted in pecuniary damages, making the imposition of restitution in this case 
mandatory rather than discretionary. See State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417,420 (Utah 1987). 
Due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution requires that prior 
to a deprivation of property a person must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
See, e,g., Plumb v. State. 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 
1207, 1211 (Utah 1983); W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 761 
(Utah App. 1990). However, defendant did receive notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
In Burlett v. Holden, an inmate complained that he was deprived of due process 
when the Department of Corrections ordered him to pay restitution as a consequence of 
a disciplinary violation. 835 P.2d989,991 (UiahApp. 1992). This Court ruled that since 
the inmate was provided with notice of the disciplinary charges against him and was given 
the opportunity for a hearing on those charges, his rights to due process were not violated 
by the imposition of restitution. Id. 
Defendant received ample due process under Burlett. He was notified of the 
allegations against him by the information, which charged him with committing third-
degree felony theft for stealing property or services worth a minimum of $1,000 but not 
more than $5,000 (R. 1). The amount of the victim's loss was directly relevant to the 
degree of felony with which defendant was charged. Defendant does not deny that he 
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received sufficient notice of the issues to be determined at his trial, nor that the value of 
the property or services stolen was one of those issues. 
Furthermore, defendant received a full hearing on the issues before the trial court. 
He was provided an opportunity to contest the imposition of restitution during the 
restitution colloquy. The restitution colloquy itself took the form of a hearing. The trial 
court entertained argument from defendant regarding the amount of restitution to be 
imposed, including the offset for defendant's final paycheck, and the prosecutor proffered 
the victim's testimony that the figure of $882.00 would be acceptable to him. Finally, the 
court determined the restitution amount exactly as defendant requested. 
Having received notice of the issues to be determined and an opportunity to be 
heard before the court regarding the matters at issue, defendant received due process. 
E. The Fact that the Trial Court's Did Not Consider the Factors Listed in Section 
76-3-201(8Kc) on the Record Does Not Warrant Reversal of the Restitution 
Order, 
Defendant argues that the court erred in failing to consider the factors set forth in 
section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) on the record. Appellant's Brief at 17. Defendant mentions this 
issue only incidently, and the matter is cursorily briefed. See id. Since the claim is 
inadequately briefed, this Court should decline to address it. However, even if the Court 
decides to reach the merits, the Court should affirm the restitution order because 
defendant, in asking the trial court to determine restitution, acknowledged that there was 
no impediment to the imposition of restitution, and actively waived the entry of findings. 
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Finally, even if the court erred in failing to consider the Subsection 8(c) factors on the 
record, defendant was not prejudiced thereby. 
Inadequate Briefing. Under rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a 
party to an appeal must provide an argument containing the "contentions and reasons of 
the [party] with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on." Utah's appellate courts have ruled that when a party fails to 
comply with this rule, the court will decline to address the issue because "a reviewing 
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not 
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of irgument and 
research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988); see also Burns v. 
Summerhavs. 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct. Ap; 1996); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599,602 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). Here, defendant has failed to adequately brief the issue of whether 
findings were required under Subsection 8(b), and the court should accordingly decline 
to consider it. 
Affirmative Waiver. Even if the issue of lack of explicit findings in the record 
under Subsection 8(c) had been adequately briefed, defendant's request that the trial court 
determine restitution acted as an acknowledgment that the Subsection 8(c) factors imposed 
no barrier to the imposition of full restitution. Hence, defendant waived entry of specific 
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findings-not merely by failing to object to the court's determination of restitution, but by 
affirmatively requesting imposition of restitution. 
Subsection 8(c) provides that 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for 
court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)[7] and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the 
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with 
regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an 
installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the 
court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the 
payment of restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines 
make restitution inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(8) (Supp. 1997). 
When a defendant's criminal activity has resulted in pecuniary damages, the 
imposition of restitution is mandatory. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998). 
"The trial court is statutorily mandated to order the payment of restitution unless the court 
finds that restitution is inappropriate." State v. Snvder, 7^7 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987). 
Here, defendant's request that the court determine restitution acted as an acknowledgment 
7The "factors listed in Subsection 8(b)" are " (i) the cost of the damage or loss if 
the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the 
offense; (ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices 
relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care . . . and (iii) the cost of necessary 
funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a victim." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(b) (Supp. 1998). 
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that restitution was appropriate. The Subsection 8(c) factors involve matters which, 
depending on a defendant's circumstances, could conceivably operate to either make the 
payment of restitution inappropriate, or to reduce the amount appropriate. In this case, 
defendant - having full knowledge of the nominal monetary sums at issue — asked the 
court to impose restitution. In effect, defendant represented to the court that no factors 
making full restitution inappropriate were present. Therefore, defendant waived formal 
findings on the Subsection 8(c) factors. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "failure to make required findings may result 
in plain error." State v. Labrum. 925 P.2d 937,940 (Utah 1996). "Plain error" is (1) error 
that should have been obvious to the trial court, (2) which is harmful to the defendant. 
State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied. Eldredge v. Utah. 493 U.S. 814 
(1989). However, "if trial counsel's action? amounted to an active, as opposed to a 
passive, waiver of an objection, we may decline to consider the claim of plain error." 
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). 
Such an active waiver may occur when the alleged error I, "the result of a consciously 
chosen strategy of trial counsel.... If the decision was conscious and did not amount to 
ineffective assistance of counsel,[8] . . . the failure to object should be treated as a 
conscious waiver and should preclude further consideration of the issue." Id at 158-59. 
defendant's ineffective assistance claim is discussed infra at 25-28. 
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In State v. Hall 946 P.2d 712,716-17 (Utah App. 19971 cert. denied,953 P.2d449 
(Utah 1998); this Court held that there was no error in a trial court's failure to enter 
findings supporting admission of hearsay testimony because defense counsel had made 
a conscious decision to permit the testimony as part of trial strategy. In this case, the 
record demonstrates that trial counsel had a strategic purpose in asking the trial court to 
determine restitution, thereby waiving the entry of Subsection 8(c) findings. The record 
indicates that defendant had been previously sentenced on September 23,1988 to a zero-
to-five-year term for third-degree forgery (R. 24). On December 23, 1994, he received 
concurrent one-to-fifteen-year sentences for two counts of second-degree forgery (R. 23, 
25). It is therefore apparent that he was either on parole or probation in August 1997, 
when the offense in this case was committed. At the beginning of the restitution colloquy, 
defense counsel stated that "[The prosecutor] \ as talked to us previously about sentencing 
today, and it's my understanding the State will not object to concurrent time. The main 
issue here would be restitution, and we'd ask you to order that as you felt was appropriate" 
(R. 52 at 188). Here, the prosecution's willingness to agree that his sentence for theft run 
concurrently rather than consecutively with his three prior forgery sentences could well 
have been conditioned (implicitly or explicitly) on defendant's acceptance of his 
obligation to pay full restitution. There was therefore a "conceivable strategic purpose" 
in defense counsel's conscious waiver of findings as to Subsection 8(c). 
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In light of defendant's conscious decision, based on trial strategy, to waive the 
entry of findings, this Court should decline to consider defendant's claim of error, and 
should affirm the restitution order. 
Harmless Error. In any event, if this Court determines that the failure of the court 
to consider the 8(c) factors on the record resulted in plain error, the error did not result in 
prejudice to defendant. Therefore, under the second element of plain error analysis, the 
error was harmless. 
In State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that even though a trial court erred in failing to make its reasons for ordering restitution 
part of its written order, the error was not prejudicial. In that case, the court held that 
restitution was clearly appropriate because the record showed that the defendant had stolen 
and dissipated investors' assets, and that he was capable of repaying investors because he 
was employed at the time of trial. Id. 
In the present case, any theoretical error was harmless because even if the court had 
addressed the Subsection 8(c) factors on the record, the restitution order would have been 
the same. The amount of restitution ordered was a minimal sum ($882) which, 
realistically, could have been repaid even by an incarcerated person. In addition, where 
defendant's crime was committed in the course of his employment, there was evidence in 
the record indicating that defendant had job skills and the ability to work. Therefore, as 
in Snyder, the lack of findings as to the Subsection 8(c) factors was harmless. 
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Defendant has failed to brief or even allege any grounds to conclude that the trial 
court's failure to make findings under Subsection 8(c) was harmful to him. Consequently 
his claim fails under a plain error analysis, and the restitution order should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
REQUEST A SEPARATE RESTITUTION HEARING 
DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant claims that "trial counsel's failure to timely object to the trial court's 
imposition, amount, and distribution of restitution fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment." Appellant's Brief at 19-20. Defendant's claim is not 
supported by applicable law or by the facts. 
Utah appellate courts follow the two-part test for determining whether counsel 
provided ineffective assistance set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
That standard provides that to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "a 
defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1989) (quoting Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 
803, 805 (Utah 1988)), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 0994); see also Tavlor v. Warden. 905 
P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995). Both elements must be presem in order to demonstrate 
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ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870,874 
(Utah 1993). In addition, "[p]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a 
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 
877 (Utah 1993). 
A. Defendant Has Failed to Demonstrate that Trial Counsel's Failure to Object 
to the Imposition of Restitution Fell Below an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness Because (1) There was a Reasonable Strategic Basis for 
Counsel's Failure to Object and (2) An Objection to the Restitution Order 
Would Have Been Futile. 
"In evaluating defense counsel's strategy under an ineffective-assistance analysis, 
' we give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such 
decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State v Hall 946 P.2d 
712, 719-20 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996); 
cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). Here, as discussed supra at 22-23, defense 
counsel was apparently mindful of the fact that, in light of defendant's three previous 
felony convictions, the prosecution could have advocated that his prison sentence for theft 
run consecutively with his sentences for the prior convictions. Defense counsel therefore 
reasonably could have believed that the prosecutor's failure to press for consecutive time 
was conditioned on defendant's acceptance of his obligation to pay full restitution. 
Consequently, there was a reasonable strategic basis for defense counsel's failure to object 
to the trial court's restitution determination. Therefore, the failure to object did not 
constitute objectively deficient performance. Hall 946 P.2d at 720. 
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Additionally, "[t]he failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would 
be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 
1101,1109 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Malmrose. 949 P.2d 56,58 (Utah 1982)). Here, 
defendant's liability was clear. In addition, the appropriate amount to be ordered was 
readily determinable from the documentary and testimonial evidence, and the identity of 
the victim was undisputed. Furthermore, as discussed supra at 14-16, neither the 
restitution statute, case law, nor appellant's brief provide any authority for the proposition 
that defendant would have been entitled to raise his claim for overtime wages in a 
restitution hearing.9 In light of the foregoing, defense counsel apparently recognized that 
an objection to the imposition, amount, or distribution of restitution would have been futile 
because a full restitution hearing would not have eliminated or reduced defendant's 
restitution obligation. 
In summary, the prosecutor's willingness to agree to concurrent sentencing 
provided reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel's failure to object to the imposition of 
restitution. In any event, defense counsel apparently recognized that an objection would 
have been futile. Consequently, under the first element of Strickland, defendant has failed 
to prove that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
9Indeed, the trial court may, if anything, nave committed error in defendant's favor 
by allowing an offset for the $517 in withheld wages. 
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B. Defendant has Failed to Demonstrate that Trial Counsel's Performance 
Resulted in Prejudice, 
Under the second prong of Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that but for his counsel's deficient performance, a different result would have 
occurred. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Defendant has failed to carry this burden by 
showing that his restitution obligation would have been reduced if trial counsel had 
objected to the imposition, amount or distribution of restitution. The facts of this case 
demonstrate that of two possible formulas foi determining restitution, the court used the 
formula creating the smaller restitution obligation. When asked to determine restitution, 
the court expressed its inclination to determine restitution based upon the value of the 
checks defendant received from Mrs. Crimin and failed to turn over to Landscape Express 
(R.52 at 189). The defendant asked the court to base the restitution award on the lesser 
sum of $ 1,369 expended by Landscape Express (id. at 190-91). The court gave defendant 
exactly what he asked for, imposing the lower restitution figure (id. at 192). 
Additionally, even if a separate hearing had been held, defendant has asserted no 
basis to conclude that the amount of restitution assessed against defendant could be offset 
by the value of defendant's unrelated wage claim. See pp. 14-16 herein. Therefore, since 
the amount of restitution ordered would not have been different, defendant suffered no 
prejudice as a result of his counsel's failure to object to the imposition, amount, 
distribution of restitution. 
27 
In this case, defendant has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because he has not shown that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that 
he was prejudiced thereby. Since neither component of the Strickland test has been 
demonstrated, his argument fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the restitution order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f/^ day of /Va^aouuJ^ 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing — 
Definitions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation ..nd as further defined in 
Subsection (4Xc). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (lXe). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4Xc) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes i. Men when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged wich an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Xb) tand^^ciai ^ ^ rf ^ ^ ^ burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; .
 f 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment oi 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 
1981, ch. 5f>, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19; 
1995, ch. I l l , § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, 
ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch. 
79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2,3; 1998, ch. 149, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment by ch 111, effective May 1, 1995, added 
"or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement" and made a related change in Sub-
section (4)(a)(i) 
The 1995 amendment by ch 117, effective 
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest 
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection 
(lXd), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "per-
son convicted" in Subsection (2), and added 
Subsections (4)(a)(ui) and (4)(d)(ni) 
The 1995 amendment by ch 301, effective 
May 1, 1995, added aand as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c)" at the end of Subsection 
(lXd), rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the cri-
teria and procedures for ordering restitution, 
added Subsection (8), and made several stylis-
tic changes 
The 1995 amendment by ch 337, effective 
Apnl 29, 1996, added Subsection (2Xg), redes-
ignated former Subsection (2)(g) as Subsection 
(2)(h), and deleted former Subsection (7Xc), 
requiring sentencing to the aggravated manda-
tory term m cases of substantial bodily injury to 
children during the commission of child kid-
napping or various listed child sexual assaults 
The 1995 (1st S S ) amendment, effective 
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for 
"May 1, 199*" in Subsection (2Xg) 
The 1996 amendment by ch 40, effective 
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection 
(2Xg), which read "on or after April 29,1996, to 
imprisonment at not less than five years and 
which may be for Lfe for an offense under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-3011 
and 76-5-302, or" and redesignated former Sub-
section (2)(h) as Subsection (2Xg), deleted 
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing 
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing 
under Subsection (6), and added Subsection (7) 
The 1996 amendment by ch 79, effective 
Apnl 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Kb) substituted 
"remove 1 or disqualification from" for "removal 
from or disqualification of" and in Subsection 
(4Xa)(i) adde 1 "Section" before "77-37-2 " 
The 1996 amendment by ch 241, §§ 2 and 3, 
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections 
(4)(a)(vn) and (4)(d)(iv) 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4,1998, 
in Subsection (4Xa)(i) substituted "Subsection 
(lXe)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted "and 
family member has the meaning as defined m 
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed the 
style of the internal references in Subsections 
(5Xc)(i), (5Xc)(n), and (8Xc) 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch 301, 
§ 6 provides that the amendments in ch 117 to 
Subsection (4Xa)(in) shall merge into this sec-
tion, as amended by ch 301, as Subsection 
(4Xa)(vi). 
Laws 1995, ch 337 was effective May 1,1995, 
however, § 76-3-201 3 postponed the amend-
ment of this section by ch 337 until April 29, 
1996 
Addendum B 
1 from the Court, that there is evidence or proof beyond a 
2 reasonable doubt that he did obtain those checks and use 
3 those services intentionally and knowing to deprive the 
4 owner, Mr. Howard, of the property and that the value of 
5 that property was more than $1,000 and less than $5,000, and 
6 that these events occurred during August of 1977 in Davis 
7 County, State of Utah. 
8 On the basis of those findings, the Court would 
9 find the defendant guilty of the crime of theft, a felony of 
10 the third degree. 
11 Now, Mr. Blanchard, you have a right to be 
12 sentenced in not less than two or more than forty-five days. 
13 Would you like a presentence report in this case before we 
14 set sentencing in this matter? 
15 MR. ALBRIGHT: Your Honor, I have advised Mr. 
16 Blanchard of his right to have the presentence report done. 
17 He informs me he's at the prison, he doesn't feel that it 
18 would do any good, that they would recommend a prison 
19 commitment. That's my understanding based on his history. 
20 I feel the same way, that they would probably, in all 
21 likelihood, recommend a prison commitment. 
22 Mr. Harward has talked to us previously about 
23 sentencing today, and it's my understanding the State will 
24 not object to concurrent time. The main issue here would be 
25 J restitution, and we'd ask you to order that as you felt was 
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1 appropriate. 
2 Have I stated everything correctly, Mr. Blanchard? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: [Inaudible] restitution. 
4 MR. HARWARD: That's correct* I do have comments 
5 and judgments [inaudible]. 
6 THE DEFENDANT: [Inaudible: ry payroll commences. 
7 MR. HARWARD: And I'm willing to recommend that 
8 the sentence commitment be concurrent with the term he's now 
9 J serving. We do want an order of restitution, I guess there 
10 are different ways you can approach this, because we're 
11 claiming — 
12 THE COURT: Well, let me tell you that I would 
13 probably order a restitution in this case, in that if it 
14 wants to be different from that or argued, I would argue 
15 that .restitution of the $l,8fi for the three checks, less an 
16 offset for the last payroll check that he's due. So it 
17 would the five hundred -- what is it, thirty-one? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Seventeen. 
19 THE COURT: So it would 1,821 minus $517. So it 
20 would be $1,304. 
21 MR. HARWARD: Yes. 
22 MR. ALBRIGHT: Your Honor, the victim here, Paul 
23 Howard, gave an itemized rtatement to the Court, and it 
24 totaled $1,300. The $600 out of the $1,821 that you've 
25 J mentioned was actually given for topsoil or it went toward 
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1 topsoil, was paid off, as I understood. 
2 THE COURT: Well, my understanding is that he got 
3 a check for that topsoil already. This is money that he 
4 received from Mrs. Crimins for this job, went in, and should 
5 have been paid to Landscape Express. I mean, I believe that 
6 the Court — 
7 MR. ALBRIGHT: Do you want to have a hearing, or 
8 do we want to it — I mean. 
9 MR. HARWARD: I think that's better the way the 
10 Court did it. 
11 MR. ALBRIGHT: The $1,821 minus ~ 
12 MR. HARWARD: With an offset for the — 
13 THE COURT: Last week's wages. 
14 MR. HARWARD: And then both parties need to be 
15 advised, this doesn't affect any civil claim one way — 
16 THE COURT: Anything for overtime or any of that 
17 stuff will have to be dealt with separately. 
18 MR. ALBRIGHT: You can still sue. 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Not from incarceration you can't. 
20 MR. ALBRIGHT: You need to let the Court know if 
21 you feel comfortable — 
22 Your order, then, would actually be for — 
23 THE DEFENDANT: 'Cause I tnink it should be — he 
24 should not be entitled to earn a profit on the side jobs 
25 I where I did all the labor myself. If he's only out thirteen 
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hundred and something dollars in materials and labor, as 
you're claiming, then my $500 should be subtracted from that 
and difference should be paid to him. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: I wonder if we could ask him — 
THE DEFENDANT: 'Cause I figure I owe him about 
$500. That was stated in the original phone conversation. 
THE COURT: Well, if he's willing to accept that, 
I mean — 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Why don't we find out from Mr. 
Howard if he's willing to accept the — it would actually 
take it down to about $800 and something, the thirteen that 
he asked for minus — 
THE COURT: It would be, what, $1,369? 
MR. ALBRIGHT: $1,369. 
MR. HARWARD: In the context of restitution in a 
criminal case, he would accept a restitution order for 
the amount, the $1,300 that he — 
THE COURT: $1,369. 
MR. HARWARD: -- less the — 
THE COURT: $517. 
MR. HARWARD: Yes. However, 
going — the tools and things that you 
collateral, he wants to know if he can 
way of getting recovery the — 
THE DEFENDANT: I have a $30 
here's something he's 
re holding for 
get permission, some 
trailer hitch, but 
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1 itfs locked in the back of a storage unit, so... 
2 MR. HARWARD: Okay. If I could — 
3 THE DEFENDANT: I could send him a check for 30 
4 bucks sometime. 
5 MR. ALBRIGHT: Do you want to add 30 onto — 
6 MR. HARWARD: Can we add that on? 
7 MR. ALBRIGHT: You keep the hitch. 
8 MR. HARWARD: Okay. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: I don't have any other tools. 
10 MR. HARWARD: All right. 
11 THE COURT: Then the Court will enter the 
12 following sentence to the charge of theft, a felony of the 
13 third degree. The defendant is sentenced to Utah State 
14 Prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five years. 
15 Restitution is set in the amount $882, that was the $1,369 
16 paid by Landscape Express less the $517 wages withheld, so 
17 it would be an offset for the wage claim, and then there 
18 would be $30 for the trailer hitch. The Court would order 
19 an additional $250 for public defender fees. The Court 
20 would order that sentence to run concurrent with any present 
21 sentence in the Utah State Prison. 
22 Now I need to advise you, if you'd like to appeal 
23 J the sentence I have entered, you must make that appeal 
24 within 30 days. I don't think there's a question about 
25 I that. 
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